JAPANESE SUB SHELLS U.S. WEST COAST

Santa Barbara, California February 23, 1942

Japanese submarines initiated the first shore bom­bard­ments of the war with an attack on the U.S. Navy base at John­ston Island in the Paci­fic in mid-Decem­ber 1941, just days after Japa­nese carrier-based planes had destroyed, in their sur­prise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, one-half of the United States’ naval power. Japa­nese sub­marines briefly shelled the Amer­i­can Paci­fic outpost on Mid­way Island in Janu­ary 1942. The following month, on this date, Febru­ary 23, 1942, Japa­nese sub­marine I‑17 made the first enemy attack on the U.S. main­land since the War of 1812. Shortly after 7 p.m., the I‑17 sur­faced several hun­dred yards off a beach west of Santa Bar­bara, Califor­nia, and for the next 20 minutes fired 17 or 25 rounds (sources vary) from her 140mm/­5.5‑inch deck gun at the Rich­field (now ARCO) avia­tion fuel stor­age tanks on a bluff behind the beach. The shots badly missed the tanks but destroyed an oil derrick and damaged a pier and a pump house. News of the Ell­wood oil field shelling trig­gered an inva­sion scare up and down the West Coast, as the Japanese had hoped.

Two nights later trigger-happy U.S. Army anti-aircraft bat­teries ex­ploded into action over the blacked-out city of Los Angeles. During a 30‑minute fusil­lade, guns hurled 1,440 rounds of 3‑inch and 37mm am­mu­ni­tion into the search­light-swept night sky. About 10 tons of shrap­nel and dud shells fell back on the city of 1.5 mil­lion people, damaging resi­dences, ship­yards, and air­craft plants where late-night shifts were at work. Eight people died that night, three of heart attacks, the others in acci­dents related to the black­out. At a press con­fer­ence shortly after­ward, Sec­re­tary of the Navy Frank Knox called the in­ci­dent, known in con­tem­porary media as “The Battle of Los Angeles” or “The Great Los Angeles Air Raid,” a “false alarm” stemming from “war nerves.” Actually, the false alarm was touched off by a weather balloon.

Not everyone bought the government’s assur­ances. The California Long Beach Inde­pen­dent edi­tori­alized: “There is a mys­terious reti­cence about the whole affair and it appears that some form of cen­sor­ship is trying to halt dis­cus­sion on the matter.” Others spec­u­lated that the in­ci­dent was either staged or exag­gerated to give defense in­dus­tries like Douglas (now Boeing) Air­craft then in Long Beach and in Santa Monica an excuse to move further in­land. (Secretary Knox encouraged their moving.)

The Great Los Angeles Air Raid was front-page news and fodder for news­paper edi­tors around the nation. Ameri­cans were living through scary times, so people believed. Many West Coast resi­dents imagined the worst—that after the surprise Japa­nese air and naval attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 2½ months before, enemy planes might suddenly show up in the middle of the night and unload their bombs on their own com­mu­ni­ties, or that a Japa­nese inva­sion force might appear off their undefended beaches, hook up with tens of thou­sands of Ameri­can-born Japa­nese (Nisei) and Japa­nese nationals living among them (50,000 in Los Angeles alone), and jointly unleash may­hem and destruc­tion. Truth was, as it turned out, during 1941 and 1942 I‑17 was one of 10 Japa­nese “cruiser” (I‑class) sub­marines that rou­tinely patrolled off the Pacific West Coast, Alaska, and Baja Cali­for­nia, never to bag a high-value target like a battle­ship or an air­craft carrier. And, with the excep­tion of sinking a hand­ful of oil tankers, a single cargo steamer, and one Soviet mine-laying sub­marine, followed in 1944 and 1945 by hun­dreds of explosive-laden hydro­gen-filled balloons (fūsen bakudan) Japan sent aloft on the jet stream to drop, hit or (mostly) miss, on the North Amer­i­can con­ti­nent, . . . well, that was about as scary as it really ever got for West Coast residents.


The Japanese Sub I-17 Brought War and Pandemonium to the U.S. Mainland. More Japanese Subs Were on Their Way to the West Coast

L.A. Times article on Battle of Los Angeles

Above: The February 26, 1942, Los Angeles Times edition covered the “Battle of Los Angeles” and its after­math. Times headlines screamed: “ARMY SAYS ALARM REAL.” In a front-page edi­torial the news­paper stated that “con­sider­able public con­fu­sion and excite­ment” had been caused by the air raid alert. In some of the most imag­i­na­tive reporting of the war, articles described shrap­nel-strewn areas of the city, pro­perty damage, and people finding unex­ploded ordi­nance. The rival Los Angeles Exam­iner described “shrap­nel-strewn” neigh­bor­hoods that “took on the appear­ance of a huge Easter-egg hunt [as] young­sters and grown­ups alike scrambled through streets and vacant lots, picking up and proudly com­paring chunks of shrap­nel frag­ments.” The Army roped off entire streets, placing large signs at both ends warning “DANGER UNEX­PLODED BOMB.” There were no unex­ploded bombs—at least from Japa­nese air­craft—not­with­standing Sec­re­tary of War Henry L. Stim­son’s public asser­tion that 15 enemy planes had over­flown the city the pre­vious night, possi­bly launched from secret Japa­nese air­fields or sub­marines, and the Examiner’s spurious claim that three planes had been shot down over the ocean. After the war Japa­nese officials denied sending planes over Los Angeles on the night of the “Great Los Angeles Air Raid.”

Wartime Office of Civilian Defense posterCalifornia couple hangs blackout drapes in their home

Above: Civil defense sign encourages U.S. residents to hang black­out curtains in their homes and places of busi­ness and gatherings to prevent enemy pilots from seeing even a glim­mer of light from where they lived, worked, and gathered (left). Setting an example, Presi­dent Frank­lin D. Roose­velt ord­ered black­out curt­ains for the 60 rooms and 20 bath­rooms in the White House. A Califor­nia couple (right) follows the advice of the Office of Civil­ian Defense, set up by Roose­velt on May 20, 1941, before the out­break of war, and hangs black cloth over win­dows in their resi­dence. Pearl Harbor jitters led to depart­ment and hard­ware stores being emptied of flash­lights, candles, lanterns, port­able radios, first-aid kits, camping stoves and the like. The urge to strike back against Impe­rial Japan as well as ally-in-arms Nazi Germany took hold rela­tively quickly, and inva­sion fears and hys­teria among West Coast resi­dents dissipated as the months wore on.

I-400-class Japanese subAichi M6A1 Seiran seaplane

Left: The mammoth Sentoku, or I‑400-class submarine. Difficult though it is, note the long water-tight, tube-like plane hangar on the sub’s aft deck and the forward deck’s com­pressed-air air­plane cata­pult and collaps­ible crane for retrieving returning planes. Japa­nese plans called for building a fleet of 18 I‑400-class sub­marines, at 400 ft/­122 m in length and displacing 6,670 tons, by far the largest and among the most deadly subs ever built until the 1960s. Though they could fire tor­pe­does (eight on board) like other sub­marines, the super-subs were designed as under­water air­craft carriers, each equipped with three Aichi M6A1 sea­plane bombers. Their mis­sion was to travel more than half­way around the world (the I‑400 had a range of over 30,000 nau­ti­cal miles/­55,560 km and carried a crew of close to 200 men), sur­face off the North Amer­i­can coasts or the Panama Canal, and launch their deadly air attack. A gener­a­tion ahead of their time, con­struc­tion began on the first I‑400 at the Kure dock­yard (near Hiro­shima) on Janu­ary 18, 1943. Only three Sentokus were com­pleted; two entered ser­vice without seeing com­bat. An attack scheduled for August 17, 1945, on the U.S. Navy’s Ulithi Atoll staging area in the Caro­line Islands of the western Pacific was scrubbed owing to Japan’s surrender three days earlier.

Right: A two-man Aichi M6A1 Seiran seaplane, the type carried aboard I‑400-class subs. The brain­child of Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Adm. Isoroku Yama­moto, the archi­tect of the Japa­nese naval attack on Pearl Harbor, the I‑400-class sub­marine was designed to carry two or three Seirans (which trans­lates as “mist on a clear day”), each cap­able of carrying one 1,800‑lb/­816-kg bomb or torpedo for up to 739 miles/­642 nau­tical miles. The late-war I‑400-class “wonder weapon” was unknown to U.S. intel­ligence, despite having broken the Japanese naval code.

Japan Sends Subs to Strike California, Oregon. Builds Aircraft-Carrying Super Submarines (Skip first 40 seconds)