World War II Day by Day

Moscow, Soviet Union (USSR) • March 23, 1941

On this date in 1941 Japanese Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsu­oka (1940–1941) arrived in Moscow after a 7‑day jour­ney by train from the Sibe­rian port city of Vladi­vostok. On this his first of two visits to senior Soviet offi­cials, Matsu­oka met Soviet Pre­mier Vya­che­slav Molotov. At the top of Matsu­oka’s diplo­matic agenda to three world capitals—the Soviet Union’s, Germany’s, and Italy’s—was his effort to reverse the pre­vious Decem­ber’s dead­lock between his nation and the Soviet Union over the con­tents of a neu­tral­ity (or non­ag­gres­sion) pact accept­able to both signa­tories, “pending,” as the U.S. ambas­sador in Moscow explained in a con­fi­den­tial Febru­ary 27 tele­gram to the State Depart­ment, “the solu­tion of cer­tain out­standing ques­tions between the two coun­tries.” Indeed, last year’s draft had largely been held up by Japan’s refusal to cede the south­ern half of Sakha­lin Island (Kara­futo in Japa­nese) and cer­tain islands in the neigh­boring Karil (Chisima) archi­pel­ago. The island terri­to­ries had been awarded by the Treaty of Ports­mouth to the Japa­nese following their aston­ishing vic­tory in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japa­nese War. (For 30 years prior to 1905, south Sakha­lin Island, which lay north of the large Japa­nese island of Hok­kaido, had been valu­able to Czarist Russia on account of its timber, coal, oil, and fish resources.)

According to Japan’s ambassador to Moscow (1940–1942), Lt. Gen. Yoshit­sugu Tate­kawa, Matsu­oka’s visits to Berlin and Rome following his brief appear­ance in Moscow were strictly “camou­flage”: the Japa­nese foreign minis­ter really had “nothing he wanted to dis­cuss” with Adolf Hitler or Benito Musso­lini. The raison d’étre for his Euro­pean trip was ful­filled during Matsu­oka’s April return trip to Moscow, namely, fines­sing lan­guage what would become the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact.

Signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941, by Molo­tov for the Soviet Union and by Matsu­oka and Ambas­sador Tate­kawa for Japan, the first arti­cle in the treaty focused on “main­tain[ing] peace­ful and friendly rela­tions” between the two states and “respect[ing] the terri­to­rial integ­rity and invi­o­la­bility” of each. Article 2 addressed the issue of neu­trality should either nation “become the object of hostil­i­ties” by one or more non-con­tracting powers “through­out the dura­tion of the con­flict.” Article 3 defined the dura­tion of the pact—5 years following its ratifi­ca­tion by each con­tracting nation unless either nation “denounces the Pact one year before the expi­ra­tion of the term”; other­wise, the pact would be auto­ma­tic­ally extended for another 5 years. On the same day the three states­men signed a second treaty “pledg[ing] to respect the terri­torial integ­rity and invi­o­la­bility” of their two client states on the Chi­nese main­land—Japan’s Man­chu­kuo (Man­chu­ria and Jehol), former pro­vin­ces of North­east China seized in 1931–1932, and the Soviet Union’s Mon­go­lian People’s Republic (Outer Mongolia) since 1921.

Fortune did not reward the two con­tracting nations for long. Japan’s Tripar­tite Treaty (1940–1945) part­ner, Germany, mounted an unpro­voked attack on the Soviet Union on June 21, 1941, 70 days after the signing of the Soviet-Japan­ese Neu­trality Pact. On Decem­ber 7, 1941, Japan mounted its own unpro­voked attack against the United States 5½ months after that. In between June and Decem­ber the United States in late Octo­ber dispatched its first Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union, thus entering into an U.S.-Soviet mili­tary alli­ance that lasted through August 1945, when Japan capit­u­lated to the Allies 14 weeks after Germany.

On April 5, 1945, Molotov, sole Soviet signa­tory to the 1941 Japa­nese-Soviet Neu­trality Pact, stated that “Japan, ally of Germany, is aiding the latter in its war against the USSR [and] the USA and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union. . . . In these circum­stances the neu­trality pact between Japan and the USSR has lost its sense, and the pro­longa­tion of that pact has become impos­sible.” Three days later Molotov announced over Moscow radio that the Soviet Union stood with its Western allies and that “from August 9 the Soviet Govern­ment will consider itself to be at war with Japan.”

Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka Returns to Tokyo Bearing Gifts

Left: German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribben­trop, Matsu­oka, and Hitler confer in Berlin as seen in this photo from late March 1941. On the eve of his much-publicized trip to the major capitals of conti­nental Europe Matsu­oka told reporters that following “a whirl­wind of offi­cial duties [in Japan] . . . I have some leisure and I am taking this trip to Europe.” To counter any sus­picions other­wise, the offi­cial Japa­nese news agency, Domei, assured the inter­national com­mu­nity that “his [Matsu­oka’s] mis­sion to Europe is as peace­ful as peace­ful can be.” Hardly that. His treaty achieve­ments in Moscow not­with­standing, his two visits to Berlin sand­wiched between a visit to Benito Musso­lini’s Rome were sweet music to the ears of Tokyo’s war­lords. Should Japan “get into” con­flict with the United States, “Germany would,” Hitler pro­mised Matsu­oka, “inter­vene immedi­ately . . . , for the strength of the three Pact powers was their com­mon action” lest they be picked off singly by the U.S. Hitler’s gratu­i­tous and unso­lic­ited 1941 offer became a verbal coda to Article 3 of the 1940 Tripar­tite (Axis) Pact entered into by Germany, Italy, and Japan the pre­vious year in Berlin. In the after­math of Decem­ber 7’s sur­prise (to Hitler and Mus­so­lini alike) Japa­nese attack on Pearl Harbor, Germany and Italy were per­force sucked into a world war with the United States, ready or not.

Right: The assurances Hitler and Ribben­trop gave Matsu­oka in late March and early April 1941 were made all the sweeter for Japan’s war hawks following the suc­cess­ful nego­ti­a­tions Matsu­oka and Tate­kawa con­cluded with Soviet offi­cials on the last leg of the foreign minis­ter’s return to Tokyo. The Japanese-Soviet Neu­trality Pact of April 13, 1941 (also known as the Soviet-Japa­nese Non­aggres­sion Pact), ensured that Japan would not be dragged into a con­flict between Germany and the Soviet Union when Nazi Germany unleashed its ill-fated attack on the Soviet Union in mid-1941. Hitler’s skul­dug­gery was, of course, in vio­la­tion of the Soviet-German (Molotov-Ribben­trop) Non­aggres­sion Pact that the two erst­while ene­mies had signed in August 1939. Japan’s north­ern flank in East Asia was thus pro­tected by mutual agree­ment when Japan expanded mili­tarily into South­east Asia; in turn, the Soviet Union’s east­ern flank was pro­tected by treaty with Japan as Stalin with­drew troops and materiel from Siberia to con­cen­trate resources in the Euro­pean theater of war. Matsu­oka’s tease to reporters covering his depar­ture to Europe in March 1941, namely, “I must return as soon as pos­si­ble, as the Japa­nese nation seems to be looking forward to what pre­sents I will bring back,” did indeed cheer—to say nothing about emboldening—Tokyo’s war planners. As early as January 1941 Adm. Isoroku Yama­moto had begun developing plans that cul­mi­nated in the land-sea-air assault on Amer­i­can, British, and Dutch Asia-Pacific pos­ses­sions in Decem­ber of the same year. Inter­est­ingly, Matsu­oka tried stran­gling the off­spring of his April 1941 Moscow assig­na­tion with­in months of its birth, urging Japa­nese leaders to include invading Siberia in their war plans, but to no avail and he was dismissed from office.

The Role of the Japanese-Soviet Neu­trality Pact in World War II