JAPAN UNAFRAID OF WAR WITH U.S.

TODAY

Tokyo, Japan • July 2, 1941

On this date in 1941, in an Im­perial Con­fer­ence of high-level Japa­nese offi­cials (Gozen Kaigi), Shōwa Emperor Hiro­hito sanctioned the mili­tary seizure of bases in the south of Vichy French Indo­china (present-day Viet­nam). It was in keeping with Japan’s so-far unsuc­cess­ful attempts to force the surrender of their Chinese enemy, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nation­alist govern­ment, by severing land links with its chief backers, the United States and Great Britain, that ran through the French colony. Only 10 months earlier Japanese forces had gained access to 3 air­fields and per­mission to maintain a 6,000‑man garrison in Northern French Indochina.

Authorized by the July 2 Imperial Conference, Japan moved its armed forces into Southern French Indo­china on July 25, 1941, and announced a protec­torate over the whole of the French colony (today’s Viet­nam, Laos, and Cam­bodia). Tokyo did this in defiance of a U.S. State Depart­ment warning the pre­vious Septem­ber against any attempt to change the status of French Indo­china after the mother country had succumbed to Japan’s Axis ally, Nazi Germany. In carrying out their ground and naval deploy­ments in Southern French Indo­china, the Japa­nese govern­ment and Japan’s Army and Naval General Staffs had decided that the nation would not be deterred by the possi­bility of becoming involved in a war with the U.S. and Great Britain. Emperor Hiro­hito, in giving cere­monial sanction to his mili­tary’s plan to occupy all of French Indo­china, accepted the possi­bility of the action sparking a war with West that he wished to avoid.

The next day, July 26, 1941, an angry Frank­lin D. Roose­velt issued an executive order to freeze all Japa­nese assets in the U.S., totaling $130 mil­lion dollars, in effect bringing all finan­cial and import and export trade trans­actions in which Japa­nese inter­ests were involved under U.S. govern­ment con­trol. Oil-rich Nether­lands East Indies (present-day Indo­nesia) followed the U.S. lead by freezing Japa­nese assets and oil exports. Great Britain, Australia, and New Zea­land like­wise froze Japa­nese assets, while Great Britain went further by announcing its intention to end bilateral commerce.

Early in September 1941 Japanese officials gave their diplo­mats until Octo­ber to reverse the policy of the West­ern powers. At an Im­perial Con­fer­ence on Novem­ber 5, 1941, Gen. Hideki Tōjō—war min­is­ter, home min­is­ter, and since Octo­ber 17 prime min­is­ter—said Japan must be pre­pared to go to war with the West, with the time for mili­tary action ten­ta­tively set for Decem­ber 1, less than a month away, if diplo­macy with the U.S. and Euro­pean colo­nial powers failed to im­prove rela­tions and reverse eco­nomic sanc­tions. Just before the Decem­ber 1 dead­line Kichisa­burō No­mura, Japan’s ambas­sador to Washing­ton, reported failing to over­come the Roose­velt adminis­tra­tion’s insis­tence on Japan’s with­drawing its armed forces from China and halting its aggres­sive South­east Asian incur­sions before the U.S. would resume trade with his country.

On December 1 another Imperial Conference offi­cially sanc­tioned war against the United States, Great Britain, and the Nether­lands. Con­tin­ued talks in Wash­ing­ton to heal the breach between the two nations were a smoke­screen for Vice-Adm. Chūi­chi Na­gu­mo’s Striking Force of 6 air­craft carriers as they made their way to the Hawai­ian Islands and took up posi­tions on Decem­ber 4, 1941, 250 miles/­402 kilo­meters north­west of their des­ig­nated tar­gets: the U.S. Pacific Fleet riding at anchor at Pearl Harbor and U.S. aircraft parked smartly at Hickman Field.

Noriko Kawamura’s Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War provides a con­vincing reapprai­sal of Japan’s Hiro­hito few Westerners would recog­nize when­ever they are reminded of Pearl Harbor and the Pacific con­flict. This owes largely to Kawa­mura’s drawing on a huge number of primary and secondary Japanese-lan­guage sources—some of them only recently avail­able to scholars. Mining them Kawa­mura draws a portrait of an emperor person­ally against waging war with the West, all the while offi­cially sanc­tioning (as required by the Japa­nese [Meiji] consti­tu­tion) state decisions that led to the events of Decem­ber 7, 1941. Once Japan’s leaders launched their nation’s high-risk cam­paign to seize Western colo­nial interests, Hiro­hito assumed the mantle of supreme com­mander in chief (daigensui) of all Japa­nese armed forces, again as required under the consti­tu­tion. Kawa­mura por­trays Hiro­hito growing ever more skep­ti­cal of a favor­able mili­tary out­come as Japanese vic­tories over the enemy proved more elu­sive by the month. Terri­fied by the pro­spect of “Japan’s anni­hi­la­tion,” as Hiro­hito him­self put it, the emperor at last flexed his moral muscles in a set of imperial prerog­a­tives (sei­dans), inter­vening on the side of the “peace faction” to end the con­flict he never wanted.—Norm Haskett

Emperor Hirohito and His Wartime Prime Minister, Gen. Hideki Tōjō

Hirohito (middle) as head of the Imperial Conference, 1943Gen. Hideki Tōjō, 1940

Left: Wartime photograph of Emperor Hirohito, seated in middle, as pre­siding head of an Impe­rial Con­fer­ence (Gozen Kaigi). Convened by the Japa­nese govern­ment in the presence of the emperor at his palace, Impe­rial Con­fer­ences were extra­consti­tutional con­fer­ences that focused on foreign affairs of grave national impor­tance. In the July 2, 1941, Impe­rial Con­fer­ence, Hiro­hito, despite his doubts and reser­va­tions, gave cere­monial sanction to the mili­tary’s plan to seize French Indo­china. (Although cere­monial, the emperor’s sanctions rendered deci­sions of Impe­rial Con­fer­ences sacred state deci­sions regard­less of Hiro­hito’s personal view on the matter.) At the all-important Impe­rial Con­fer­ence on Decem­ber 1, 1941, Hiro­hito sanctioned a war with the West he did not want, partly due to the enor­mous pres­sure the Japanese high com­mand exerted on him, and partly due to the failure of diplomatic negotiations with the U.S. in Washington.

Right: Tōjō in military uniform. On July 22, 1940, Tōjō was appointed Army Minis­ter. During most of the Pacific War, from Octo­ber 17, 1941 to July 22, 1944, he served as Prime Minis­ter of Japan. In that capa­city he was directly respon­si­ble for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Tōjō was forced to resign from office following the disclo­sure of Japan’s loss of Sai­pan in the Mariana Islands to U.S. Marines and soldiers. After the war Tōjō was arrested, sen­tenced to death for war crimes during the Tokyo Trials, and hanged on December 23, 1948.

History’s Verdict: Japanese Emperor Hirohito Documentary